Name File Type Size Last Modified
  replication 03/06/2024 06:02:PM

Project Citation: 

Keniston, Daniel, Larsen, Bradley, Li, Shengwu, Prescott, J.J., Silveira, Bernardo, and Yu, Chuan. Data and Code for: Splitting the Difference in Incomplete Information Bargaining: Theory and Widespread Evidence from the Field. Ann Arbor, MI: Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research [distributor], 2024-04-30. https://doi.org/10.3886/E198747V2

Project Description

Summary:  View help for Summary This paper documents a robust pattern from diverse sequential bargaining settings: agents favor offers that split the difference between the previous two offers. Our empirical settings include used-cars, insurance claims, home sale, trade tariffs, a TV game show, eBay, and auto-rickshaws. These even-split offers are more likely to be accepted, less likely to spur exit by the opponent, and more likely to be followed by subsequent split-the-difference offers if bargaining continues. We propose several theoretical frameworks to explain this behavior, including an inference argument under which split-the-difference offers can be viewed as an equal split of the potential surplus.

Scope of Project

Subject Terms:  View help for Subject Terms bargaining; negotiation; fairness; split-the-difference; incomplete information; inference; alternating offers
Geographic Coverage:  View help for Geographic Coverage United States, India, Spain, International
Data Type(s):  View help for Data Type(s) aggregate data; observational data; program source code


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