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Project Citation: 

Persico, Nicola, Lopomo, Giuseppe, and Villa, Alessandro. Data and Code for: Optimal Procurement With Quality Concerns. Nashville, TN: American Economic Association [publisher], 2023. Ann Arbor, MI: Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research [distributor], 2023-05-24. https://doi.org/10.3886/E182801V1

Project Description

Summary:  View help for Summary Adverse selection in procurement arises when low-cost bidders are also lowquality suppliers. We propose a mechanism called LoLA which, under some conditions, is the best incentive-compatible mechanism for maximizing any combination of buyer’s and social surplus in the presence of adverse selection. The LoLA features a floor (or minimum) price, and a reserve (or maximum) price. Conveniently, the LoLA has a dominant strategy equilibrium that, under mild regularity conditions, is unique. We perform a counterfactual experiment on Italian government procurement auctions: we compute the gain that the government could have made, had it used the optimal mechanism (which happens to be a LoLA), relative to a first-price auction, which is the format the government actually used.

Scope of Project

Subject Terms:  View help for Subject Terms Auctions; Procurement; Adverse Selection
JEL Classification:  View help for JEL Classification
      D44 Auctions
      H57 National Government Expenditures and Related Policies: Procurement


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