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Long-Run Peer Effects and Promotion: Evidence from 70-Plus Years of Career Records in Japan

Name: Long-Run Peer Effects and Promotion: Evidence from 70-Plus Years of Career Records in Japan
Published: 2024-09-27
License: https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0

Principal Investigator(s): View help for Principal Investigator(s) Natsuki Arai, Gettysburg College; Nobuhiko Nakazawa, Hitotsubashi University

Version: View help for Version V1

Name	File Type	Size	Last Modified
1_data			09/27/2024 02:04:AM
2_figures			09/27/2024 02:04:AM
3_tables			09/27/2024 02:07:AM
4_codes			09/27/2024 02:08:AM
README.pdf	application/pdf	86.6 KB	09/26/2024 10:12:PM
data overview.xlsx	application/vnd.openxmlformats-officedocument.spreadsheetml.sheet	10.9 KB	09/26/2024 10:14:PM

Project Citation:

Arai, Natsuki, and Nakazawa, Nobuhiko. Long-Run Peer Effects and Promotion: Evidence from 70-Plus Years of Career Records in Japan. Ann Arbor, MI: Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research [distributor], 2024-09-27. https://doi.org/10.3886/E209341V1

Project Description

Summary:

We estimate long-term peer effects in the workplace by investigating whether working with a future executive makes junior employees more likely to be promoted. Using data on career history at the Japanese central administration from 1946 to 2019, we find that long-term peer effects are substantial and persistent—junior employees who work with a future executive during the first five years of their employment are more likely to be promoted to top executive than employees who do not. The empirical results are consistent with the mechanisms of increased human capital, the formation of social connections, and a reduction in information asymmetry.

Scope of Project

JEL Classification:
      H83 Public Administration; Public Sector Accounting and Audits
      J01 Labor Economics: General
      J24 Human Capital; Skills; Occupational Choice; Labor Productivity
      M12 Personnel Management; Executives; Executive Compensation
      M51 Personnel Economics: Firm Employment Decisions; Promotions

Manuscript Number: ECIN-Feb-2024-0098.R2

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