Data and Code for: Ownership Concentration and Strategic Supply Reduction
Principal Investigator(s): View help for Principal Investigator(s) Ulrich Doraszelski, University of Pennsylvania; Katja Seim, Yale University; Michael Sinkinson, Northwestern University; Peichun Wang, Unity Operate
Version: View help for Version V1
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Project Citation:
Project Description
Article summary:
We explore the implications of ownership concentration for the recently concluded incentive auction that re-purposed spectrum from broadcast TV to mobile broadband usage in the U.S. We document significant multi-license ownership of TV stations. We show that in the reverse auction, in which TV stations bid to relinquish their licenses, multi-license owners have an incentive to withhold some TV stations to drive up prices for their remaining TV stations. Using a large-scale valuation and simulation exercise, we find that this strategic supply reduction increases payouts to TV stations by between 13.5% and 42.4%.
Scope of Project
L10 Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance: General
L51 Economics of Regulation
L96 Telecommunications
L98 Industry Studies: Utilities and Transportation: Government Policy
Related Publications
Published Versions
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