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Data and Code for: Splitting-the-Difference in Incomplete Information Bargaining: Theory and Widespread Evidence from the Field

Principal Investigator(s): View help for Principal Investigator(s) Daniel Keniston, Louisiana State University; Bradley Larsen, Washington University in St. Louis; Shengwu Li, Harvard University; J.J. Prescott, University of Michigan Law School; Bernardo Silveira, University of California, Los Angeles; Chuan Yu, Stanford University

Version: View help for Version V1

Name	File Type	Size	Last Modified
replication			03/06/2024 06:02:PM

Project Citation:

Keniston, Daniel, Larsen, Bradley, Li, Shengwu, Prescott, J.J., Silveira, Bernardo, and Yu, Chuan. Data and Code for: Splitting-the-Difference in Incomplete Information Bargaining: Theory and Widespread Evidence from the Field. Ann Arbor, MI: Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research [distributor], 2024-03-06. https://doi.org/10.3886/E198747V1

Project Description

Summary: This paper documents a robust pattern from diverse sequential bargaining settings: agents favor offers that split the difference between the previous two offers. Our empirical settings include used-cars, insurance claims, home sale, trade tariffs, a TV game show, eBay, and auto-rickshaws. These even-split offers are more likely to be accepted, less likely to spur exit by the opponent, and more likely to be followed by subsequent split-the-difference offers if bargaining continues. We propose several theoretical frameworks to explain this behavior, including an inference argument under which split-the-difference offers can be viewed as an equal split of the potential surplus.

Scope of Project

Subject Terms: bargaining; negotiation; fairness; split-the-difference; incomplete information; inference; alternating offers

Geographic Coverage: United States, India, Spain, International

Data Type(s): aggregate data; observational data; program source code

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Published Versions

V2 [2024-04-30]

V1 [2024-03-06]

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