Data and Code for: Matching Mechanisms for Refugee Resettlement
Principal Investigator(s): View help for Principal Investigator(s) David Delacretaz, University of Manchester; Scott Kominers, Harvard University; Alexander Teytelboym, Oxford University
Version: View help for Version V1
| Name | File Type | Size | Last Modified |
|---|---|---|---|
| Matching-Mechanisms-For-Refugee-Resettlement-Replication | 01/04/2024 06:01:PM |
Project Citation:
Delacretaz, David, Kominers, Scott, and Teytelboym, Alexander. Data and Code for: Matching Mechanisms for Refugee Resettlement. Nashville, TN: American Economic Association [publisher], 2024. Ann Arbor, MI: Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research [distributor], 2024-01-08. https://doi.org/10.3886/E191062V1
Project Description
Summary:
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This is the data and source code for the simulations in our paper "Matching Mechanisms for Refugee Resettlement."
The abstract of the paper is as follows:
The abstract of the paper is as follows:
Current refugee resettlement processes account for neither the preferences of refugees nor the priorities of hosting communities. We introduce a new framework for matching with multidimensional knapsack constraints that captures the (possibly multidimensional) sizes of refugee families and the capacities of communities. We propose four refugee resettlement mechanisms and two solution concepts that can be used in refugee resettlement matching under various institutional and informational constraints. Our theoretical results and simulations using refugee resettlement data suggest that preference-based matching mechanisms can improve match efficiency, respect priorities of communities, and incentivize refugees to report where they would prefer to settle.
Funding Sources:
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Australian Research Council (DP160101350);
National Science Foundation (CCF-1216095);
National Science Foundation (SES-1459912);
Economic and Social Research Council (United Kingdom) (ES/R007470/1);
Washington Center for Equitable Growth;
Harvard University (Milton Fund);
Harvard Center of Mathematical Sciences and Applications (Mathematics in Economics Research Fund);
Harvard Center of Mathematical Sciences and Applications (Ng Fund);
Institute for New Economic Thinking (Human Capital and Economic Opportunity Working Group);
Oxford Martin School;
Saïd Business School (Skoll Centre for Social Entrepreneurship);
University of Melbourne (EU Centre for Shared Complex Challenges);
University of Melbourne (Faculty of Business and Economics);
University of Melbourne (Department of Economics);
University of Melbourne (Centre for Market Design)
Scope of Project
Subject Terms:
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Matching;
Refugee Resettlement;
Market Design
JEL Classification:
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C78 Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
D47 Market Design
C78 Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
D47 Market Design
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