Drought-reliefs and Partisanship
Principal Investigator(s): View help for Principal Investigator(s) Federico Boffa, Free University of Bozen/Bolzano & Collegio Carlo Alberto; Francisco Cavalcanti, PUC-Rio; Christian Fons-Rosen, UC-Merced; Amedeo Piolatto, Autonomous University of Barcelona & BSE & IEB
Version: View help for Version V1
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Drought-reliefs-and-Partisanship.zip | application/zip | 3.8 MB | 04/14/2023 12:43:PM |
README.txt | text/plain | 1.9 KB | 04/14/2023 12:50:PM |
Project Citation:
Project Description
We combine a model of symmetric information with selfish and office-motivated politicians and an RDD analysis based on close municipal elections to study partisan bias in the allocation of drought aid relief in Brazil. We identify a novel pattern of distributive politics whereby partisan bias materialises only before municipal elections, while it disappears before presidential elections. Furthermore, before mayoral elections, it fades for extreme (high or low) aridity levels while persisting for moderate levels. Our empirical results show that in this case alignment increases the probability of receiving aid relief by a factor of two (equivalent to 18.1 p.p.).
We use the Standardised Precipitation-Evapotranspiration Index (SPEI) to measure aridity.
Scope of Project
Methodology
Sistema Integrado de Informações sobre Desastres Naturais - S2ID
Tribunal Superior Eleitoral
IBGE
Related Publications
Published Versions
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