Code for: "The Behavioral Foundations of Default Effects: Theory and Evidence from Medicare Part D"

Principal Investigator(s): View help for Principal Investigator(s) Zarek Brot-Goldberg, University of Chicago. Harris School of Public Policy; Timothy Layton, Harvard University. Harvard Medical School. Department of Health Care Policy; Boris Vabson, Harvard University. Harvard Medical School. Department of Health Care Policy; Adelina Yanyue Wang, McKinsey & Company

Version: View help for Version V1

Name	File Type	Size	Last Modified
Full			09/29/2023 07:27:PM

Project Citation:

Brot-Goldberg, Zarek, Layton, Timothy, Vabson, Boris, and Wang, Adelina Yanyue. Code for: “The Behavioral Foundations of Default Effects: Theory and Evidence from Medicare Part D.” Nashville, TN: American Economic Association [publisher], 2023. Ann Arbor, MI: Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research [distributor], 2023-09-29. https://doi.org/10.3886/E184423V1

Project Description

Summary: This is a repository for the code to replicate "The Behavioral Foundations of Default Effects: Theory and Evidence from Medicare Part D" in the American Economic Review.

The abstract of the paper is:

We show in two natural experiments that default rules in Medicare Part D have large, persistent effects on enrollment and drug utilization of low-income beneficiaries. The implications of this phenomenon for welfare and optimal policy depend on the sensitivity of passivity to the value of the default option. Using random assignment to default options, we show that beneficiary passivity is extremely insensitive, even when enrolling in the default option would result in substantial drug consumption losses. A third natural experiment suggests that variation in active choice is driven by random transitory shocks rather than the inherent attentiveness of some beneficiaries.

Scope of Project

Subject Terms: default; medicare part d; nudge

JEL Classification:
      D90 Micro-Based Behavioral Economics: General
      I10 Health: General
      I13 Health Insurance, Public and Private

Geographic Coverage: United States

Time Period(s): 2007 – 2015

Universe: Low-Income Subsidy recipients enrolled in the Medicare program, 2007-2015.

Data Type(s): administrative records data

Methodology

Data Source: CMS Medicare and Medicaid claims and enrollment data

Unit(s) of Observation: Person-year and person-quarter, primarily

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Published Versions

V1 [2023-09-29]

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