Data and Code for: ARE SMALL FIRMS LABOR CONSTRAINED? EXPERIMENTAL EVIDENCE FROM GHANA
Principal Investigator(s): View help for Principal Investigator(s) Jamie Lee McCasland, University of British Columbia; Morgan Hardy, New York University Abu Dhabi
Version: View help for Version V1
Name | File Type | Size | Last Modified |
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0104_Ahafo_Ano_North_Feasible_Sets_Clean.dta | application/x-stata-dta | 39.6 KB | 03/15/2022 01:23:PM |
0108_Asante_Akim_North_Feasible_Sets_Clean.dta | application/x-stata-dta | 37.8 KB | 03/14/2022 11:13:AM |
0118_Kumasi_Metro_Feasible_Sets_Clean.dta | application/x-stata-dta | 34.5 KB | 03/14/2022 11:13:AM |
0121_Obuasi_Feasible_Sets_Clean.dta | application/x-stata-dta | 20.1 KB | 03/14/2022 11:13:AM |
0207_Dormaa_Feasible_Sets_Clean.dta | application/x-stata-dta | 33.2 KB | 03/14/2022 11:13:AM |
0214_Pru_Feasible_Sets_Clean.dta | application/x-stata-dta | 42.4 KB | 03/14/2022 11:13:AM |
0308_Awutu_Senya_Feasible_Sets_Clean.dta | application/x-stata-dta | 49.9 KB | 03/14/2022 11:13:AM |
0314_Komenda_Feasible_Sets_Clean.dta | application/x-stata-dta | 95 KB | 03/14/2022 11:13:AM |
0401_Akuapim_North_Feasible_Sets_Clean.dta | application/x-stata-dta | 36 KB | 03/14/2022 11:13:AM |
0409_East_Akim_Feasible_Sets_Clean.dta | application/x-stata-dta | 24.5 KB | 03/14/2022 11:13:AM |
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Project Citation:
McCasland, Jamie Lee, and Hardy, Morgan. Data and Code for: ARE SMALL FIRMS LABOR CONSTRAINED? EXPERIMENTAL EVIDENCE FROM GHANA. Nashville, TN: American Economic Association [publisher], 2023. Ann Arbor, MI: Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research [distributor], 2023-03-09. https://doi.org/10.3886/E155121V1
Project Description
Summary:
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We report the results of a field experiment that randomly placed unemployed young people as apprentices with small firms in Ghana, and included no cash subsidy to firms (or workers) beyond in-kind recruitment services. Treated firms experienced increases in firm size of approximately half a worker and firm profits of approximately 10% for each apprentice placement offered, documenting frictions to novice hiring. We interpret the program as providing a novel worker screening technology to firms, as (voluntary) worker participation included non-monetary application costs, echoing the widespread use of an entrance fee mechanism for hiring apprentices in the existing labor market.
Scope of Project
JEL Classification:
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D22 Firm Behavior: Empirical Analysis
D61 Allocative Efficiency; Cost-Benefit Analysis
J23 Labor Demand
J46 Informal Labor Markets
M51 Personnel Economics: Firm Employment Decisions; Promotions
M53 Personnel Economics: Training
O12 Microeconomic Analyses of Economic Development
O14 Industrialization; Manufacturing and Service Industries; Choice of Technology
O15 Economic Development: Human Resources; Human Development; Income Distribution; Migration
D22 Firm Behavior: Empirical Analysis
D61 Allocative Efficiency; Cost-Benefit Analysis
J23 Labor Demand
J46 Informal Labor Markets
M51 Personnel Economics: Firm Employment Decisions; Promotions
M53 Personnel Economics: Training
O12 Microeconomic Analyses of Economic Development
O14 Industrialization; Manufacturing and Service Industries; Choice of Technology
O15 Economic Development: Human Resources; Human Development; Income Distribution; Migration
Geographic Coverage:
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Ghana
Time Period(s):
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2012 – 2016
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