Data and Code for: A/B Contracts

Principal Investigator(s): View help for Principal Investigator(s) George Georgiadis, Northwestern University; Michael Powell, Northwestern University

Version: View help for Version V1

Name	File Type	Size	Last Modified
ABcontracts_master.m	text/x-objcsrc	2.5 KB	09/28/2021 10:59:AM
BenchmarkOptContract.m	text/x-matlab	2.5 KB	09/28/2021 10:59:AM
Density_spline.m	text/x-matlab	1.4 KB	09/28/2021 10:59:AM
Estimate_parameters.m	text/x-matlab	790 bytes	09/28/2021 10:59:AM
Export_ABdata_Excel.do	text/plain	158 bytes	12/21/2021 01:18:PM
Export_EWdata_Excel.do	text/plain	160 bytes	09/28/2021 07:54:AM
GenerateIR.m	text/x-matlab	1.9 KB	09/28/2021 10:59:AM
Heterogeneous_RRA.m	text/x-matlab	2.8 KB	09/28/2021 10:59:AM
Heterogeneous_elasticity.m	text/x-matlab	2.7 KB	09/28/2021 10:59:AM
ImportDPdata.m	text/x-matlab	1.8 KB	09/28/2021 10:59:AM

Project Citation:

Georgiadis, George, and Powell, Michael. Data and Code for: A/B Contracts. Nashville, TN: American Economic Association [publisher], 2021. Ann Arbor, MI: Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research [distributor], 2021-12-23. https://doi.org/10.3886/E146062V1

Project Description

Summary: This paper aims to improve the practical applicability of the classic theory of incentive contracts under moral hazard. We establish conditions under which the information provided by an A/B test of incentive contracts is sufficient for answering the question of how best to improve a status quo incentive contract, given a priori knowledge of the agent's monetary preferences. We assess the empirical relevance of this result using data from DellaVigna and Pope's (2018) study of a variety of incentive contracts. Finally, we discuss how our framework can be extended to incorporate additional considerations beyond those in the classic theory.

Scope of Project

Subject Terms: mturk; incentives; labor contracts; experiment; agency problem; moral hazard

JEL Classification:
      D21 Firm Behavior: Theory
      D80 Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty: General
      D86 Economics of Contract: Theory

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Published Versions

V1 [2021-12-23]

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DDI 2.5

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