Files for "Letting the briber go free: An experiment on mitigating harassment bribes"

Principal Investigator(s):  View help for Principal Investigator(s) Klaus Abbink, Monash University; Utteeyo Dasgupta, Wagner College; Lata Gangadharan, Monash University; Tarun Jain, Indian Institute of Management Ahmedabad

Version:  View help for Version V1

Name File Type Size Last Modified
Letting_the_briber_go_free_dataset.dta application/x-stata-dta 219 KB 07/04/2021 01:05:AM
README.pdf application/pdf 315.1 KB 07/04/2021 01:03:AM
letting_the_briber_go_free.do text/plain 3.9 KB 07/04/2021 01:03:AM
letting_the_briber_go_free_figures.xlsx application/vnd.openxmlformats-officedocument.spreadsheetml.sheet 61.9 KB 07/04/2021 01:03:AM

Project Citation: 

Abbink, Klaus, Dasgupta, Utteeyo, Gangadharan, Lata, and Jain, Tarun. Files for “Letting the briber go free:  An experiment on mitigating harassment bribes.” Ann Arbor, MI: Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research [distributor], 2021-07-15. https://doi.org/10.3886/E144461V1

Project Description

Summary:  View help for Summary This paper examines the effectiveness of using asymmetric liability to combat harassment bribes. Basu (2011) advocates legal immunity for bribe-givers, while retaining culpability for bribe-takers. Results from our experiment indicate that while this policy has the potential to significantly reduce corrupt practices, weak economic incentives for the bribe-giver, or retaliation by bribe-takers can mitigate the positive disciplining effect of such an implementation. Asymmetric liability on its own may hence face challenges in the field.




, This paper examines the effectiveness of using asymmetric liability to combat harassment bribes. Basu (2011) advocates legal immunity for bribe-givers, while retaining culpability for bribe-takers. Results from our experiment indicate that while this policy has the potential to significantly reduce corrupt practices, weak economic incentives for the bribe-giver, or retaliation by bribe-takers can mitigate the positive disciplining effect of such an implementation. Asymmetric liability on its own may hence face challenges in the field.




Funding Sources:  View help for Funding Sources Monash University; Indian School of Business

Scope of Project

Subject Terms:  View help for Subject Terms Harassment bribes; Experiment; Asymmetric Penalty; Retaliation
Geographic Coverage:  View help for Geographic Coverage India
Time Period(s):  View help for Time Period(s) 2012 – 2012
Collection Date(s):  View help for Collection Date(s) 1/2012 – 2/2012
Data Type(s):  View help for Data Type(s) experimental data; survey data

Methodology

Weights:  View help for Weights None
Unit(s) of Observation:  View help for Unit(s) of Observation Individual

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Published Versions

V1 [2021-07-15]

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