Data and Code for: Auction Mechanisms and Treasury Revenue: Evidence from the Chinese Experiment

Principal Investigator(s): View help for Principal Investigator(s) Klenio Barbosa, SKEMA Business School; Dakshina De Silva, Lancaster University; Liyu Yang, Nanjing Audit University; Hisayuki Yoshimoto, University of Glasgow

Version: View help for Version V1

Name	File Type	Size	Last Modified
Example_duration_subidiesadjrates.xlsx	application/vnd.openxmlformats-officedocument.spreadsheetml.sheet	11.4 KB	04/29/2021 11:23:AM
Example_resultstable6.xlsx	application/vnd.openxmlformats-officedocument.spreadsheetml.sheet	233.5 KB	04/29/2021 11:23:AM
Primary_market_China_paper_202102_final_AEJ_Micro_2020_0216.do	text/x-stata-syntax	41.7 KB	02/27/2021 10:53:PM
Readme file.pdf	application/pdf	161.5 KB	04/29/2021 11:23:AM
Table_1.log	text/x-log	8 KB	02/27/2021 12:10:AM
Table_2.log	text/x-log	10.3 KB	02/26/2021 11:58:PM
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Table_6.xlsx	application/vnd.openxmlformats-officedocument.spreadsheetml.sheet	41.9 KB	02/27/2021 12:11:AM

Project Citation:

Barbosa, Klenio, De Silva, Dakshina, Yang, Liyu, and Yoshimoto, Hisayuki. Data and Code for: Auction Mechanisms and Treasury Revenue: Evidence from the Chinese Experiment. Nashville, TN: American Economic Association [publisher], 2022. Ann Arbor, MI: Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research [distributor], 2022-10-21. https://doi.org/10.3886/E132983V1

Project Description

Summary:

This paper exploits a large-size auction experiment conducted by two Chinese Government Treasury security issuers the Chinese Development Bank and the Export-Import Bank to investigate whether Treasury securities should be sold through uniform or

discriminatory auction mechanisms. Based on the outcomes of more than 300 Treasury securities issued through an alternating auction-rule market experiment, we find that yield rates of the two auction formats are not statistically different. Further, these estimates indicate that there is no significant economic difference in terms of revenue between the two auction mechanisms. This result is robust across different bond-yield rate measurements and participation behavior.

Scope of Project

JEL Classification:
      C57 Econometrics of Games and Auctions
      C58 Financial Econometrics
      D44 Auctions

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Published Versions

V1 [2022-10-21]

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