Data and Code for: Spillover effects of Institutions on Cooperative Behavior, Preferences, and Beliefs

Principal Investigator(s): View help for Principal Investigator(s) Florian Engl, University of Cologne; Arno Riedl, Maastricht University; Roberto Weber, University of Zurich

Version: View help for Version V1

Name	File Type	Size	Last Modified
general_analyses			02/08/2021 08:37:AM
machine_learning			02/08/2021 08:37:AM
AEJMicro_2018_0336.R2_readme_file.pdf	application/pdf	95.2 KB	02/08/2021 03:34:AM

Project Citation:

Engl, Florian, Riedl, Arno, and Weber, Roberto. Data and Code for: Spillover effects of Institutions on Cooperative Behavior, Preferences, and Beliefs. Nashville, TN: American Economic Association [publisher], 2021. Ann Arbor, MI: Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research [distributor], 2021-10-21. https://doi.org/10.3886/E128682V1

Project Description

Summary: These files contain the data and code for the journal article "Spillover Effects of Institutions on Cooperative Behavior, Preferences, and Beliefs ", American Economic Journal: Microeconomics. Most institutions are limited in scope. We study experimentally how enforcement institutions affect behavior, preferences and beliefs beyond their direct influence over the behaviors they control. Groups play two identical public good games, with cooperation institutionally enforced in one game. Institutions generally have economically significant positive spillover effects to the unregulated game. We also observe that institutions enhance conditional cooperation preferences and beliefs about others’ cooperativeness, suggesting that both factors are drivers of observed spillover effects. In additional treatments, we provide evidence for several factors, including characteristics of institutions, that enhance or limit the effectiveness and scope of spillover effects.

Scope of Project

Subject Terms: Public goods; Institutions; Spillover effect

JEL Classification:
      C92 Design of Experiments: Laboratory, Group Behavior
      D02 Institutions: Design, Formation, Operations, and Impact
      D72 Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
      H41 Public Goods

Data Type(s): experimental data; program source code

Related Publications

Download this project

Published Versions

V1 [2021-10-21]

Export Metadata

Dublin Core

DDI 2.5

Report a Problem

Found a serious problem with the data, such as disclosure risk or copyrighted content? Let us know.

This material is distributed exactly as received from the data depositor. As of April 2026, depositors are required to submit study materials in accessible formats. ICPSR has not reviewed, checked, or processed this material. For additional information about the study, please contact the investigator(s) directly. If you have questions about the accessibility of materials distributed by ICPSR or require further assistance, please visit ICPSR's Accessibility Center.