Replication Code and Data for: Escalation of Scrutiny: The Gains from Dynamic Enforcement of Environmental Regulations
Principal Investigator(s): View help for Principal Investigator(s) Wesley Blundell, Washington State University; Gautam Gowrisankaran, University of Arizona; Ashley Langer, University of Arizona
Version: View help for Version V1
| Name | File Type | Size | Last Modified |
|---|---|---|---|
| Code | 05/31/2020 10:52:AM | ||
| Counterfactual_Output | 03/30/2020 05:46:PM | ||
| Data | 03/30/2020 05:50:PM | ||
| Log_Files | 03/30/2020 06:02:PM | ||
| Parameter_Estimates | 03/30/2020 06:06:PM | ||
|
|
application/pdf | 102.4 KB | 05/30/2020 08:04:PM |
Project Citation:
Blundell, Wesley, Gowrisankaran, Gautam, and Langer, Ashley. Replication Code and Data for: Escalation of Scrutiny: The Gains from Dynamic Enforcement of Environmental Regulations. Nashville, TN: American Economic Association [publisher], 2020. Ann Arbor, MI: Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research [distributor], 2020-07-23. https://doi.org/10.3886/E118564V1
Project Description
Summary:
View help for Summary
Abstract:
The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency uses a dynamic approach to enforcing air pollution regulations, with repeat offenders subject to high fines and designation as high priority violators (HPV). We estimate the value of dynamic enforcement by developing and estimating a dynamic model of a plant and regulator, where plants decide when to invest in pollution abatement technologies. We use a fixed grid approach to estimate random coefficient specifications. Investment, fines, and HPV designation are costly to most plants. Eliminating dynamic enforcement would raise pollution damages by 164% with constant fines or raise fines by 519% with constant pollution damages.
Scope of Project
Subject Terms:
View help for Subject Terms
monitoring and compliance;
investment;
air pollution;
dynamic estimation;
escalation mechanisms;
Clean Air Act
JEL Classification:
View help for JEL Classification
C57 Econometrics of Games and Auctions
Q53 Air Pollution; Water Pollution; Noise; Hazardous Waste; Solid Waste; Recycling
Q58 Environmental Economics: Government Policy
C57 Econometrics of Games and Auctions
Q53 Air Pollution; Water Pollution; Noise; Hazardous Waste; Solid Waste; Recycling
Q58 Environmental Economics: Government Policy
Geographic Coverage:
View help for Geographic Coverage
United States
Time Period(s):
View help for Time Period(s)
2007 – 2013 (2007-2013 (Q1 2007 to Q3 2013 (plus lags)))
Related Publications
Published Versions
Report a Problem
Found a serious problem with the data, such as disclosure risk or copyrighted content? Let us know.
This material is distributed exactly as it arrived from the data depositor. ICPSR has not checked or processed this material. Users should consult the investigator(s) if further information is desired.