Replication data for: Voter Response to Peak and End Transfers: Evidence from a Conditional Cash Transfer Experiment
Principal Investigator(s): View help for Principal Investigator(s) Sebastian Galiani; Nadya Hajj; Patrick J. McEwan; Pablo Ibarrarán; Nandita Krishnaswamy
Version: View help for Version V1
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Project Citation:
Galiani, Sebastian, Hajj, Nadya, McEwan, Patrick J., Ibarrarán, Pablo, and Krishnaswamy, Nandita. Replication data for: Voter Response to Peak and End Transfers: Evidence from a Conditional Cash Transfer Experiment. Nashville, TN: American Economic Association [publisher], 2019. Ann Arbor, MI: Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research [distributor], 2019-12-07. https://doi.org/10.3886/E116522V1
Project Description
Summary:
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In a Honduran field experiment, sequences of cash transfers to poor households varied in amount of the largest (peak) and last (end) transfers. Larger peak-end transfers increased voter turnout and the incumbent party's vote share in the 2013 presidential election, independently of cumulative transfers. A plausible explanation is that voters succumbed to a common cognitive bias by applying peak-end heuristics. Another is that voters deliberately used peak-end transfers to update beliefs about the incumbent party. In either case, the results provide experimental evidence on the classic non-experimental finding that voters are especially sensitive to recent economic activity.
Scope of Project
JEL Classification:
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C93 Field Experiments
D72 Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
I32 Measurement and Analysis of Poverty
O15 Economic Development: Human Resources; Human Development; Income Distribution; Migration
O17 Formal and Informal Sectors; Shadow Economy; Institutional Arrangements
C93 Field Experiments
D72 Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
I32 Measurement and Analysis of Poverty
O15 Economic Development: Human Resources; Human Development; Income Distribution; Migration
O17 Formal and Informal Sectors; Shadow Economy; Institutional Arrangements
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