Replication data for: Does Elite Capture Matter? Local Elites and Targeted Welfare Programs in Indonesia
Principal Investigator(s): View help for Principal Investigator(s) Vivi Alatas; Abhijit Banerjee; Rema Hanna; Benjamin A. Olken; Ririn Purnamasari; Matthew Wai-Poi
Version: View help for Version V1
| Name | File Type | Size | Last Modified |
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| EliteCapturePaper | 12/07/2019 03:39:PM | ||
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text/plain | 14.6 KB | 12/07/2019 10:39:AM |
Project Citation:
Alatas, Vivi, Banerjee, Abhijit, Hanna, Rema, Olken, Benjamin A., Purnamasari, Ririn, and Wai-Poi, Matthew. Replication data for: Does Elite Capture Matter? Local Elites and Targeted Welfare Programs in Indonesia. Nashville, TN: American Economic Association [publisher], 2019. Ann Arbor, MI: Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research [distributor], 2019-12-07. https://doi.org/10.3886/E116471V1
Project Description
Summary:
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This paper investigates how elite capture affects the welfare gains from targeted government transfer programs in Indonesia, using both a high-stakes field experiment that varied the extent of elite influence and nonexperimental data on a variety of existing government programs. While the relatives of those holding formal leadership positions are more likely to receive benefits in some programs, we argue that the welfare consequences of elite capture appear small: eliminating elite capture entirely would improve the welfare gains from these programs by less than one percent.
Scope of Project
JEL Classification:
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D72 Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
H53 National Government Expenditures and Welfare Programs
I38 Welfare, Well-Being, and Poverty: Government Programs; Provision and Effects of Welfare Programs
O15 Economic Development: Human Resources; Human Development; Income Distribution; Migration
O17 Formal and Informal Sectors; Shadow Economy; Institutional Arrangements
D72 Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
H53 National Government Expenditures and Welfare Programs
I38 Welfare, Well-Being, and Poverty: Government Programs; Provision and Effects of Welfare Programs
O15 Economic Development: Human Resources; Human Development; Income Distribution; Migration
O17 Formal and Informal Sectors; Shadow Economy; Institutional Arrangements
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