Replication data for: Incentive Schemes, Sorting, and Behavioral Biases of Employees: Experimental Evidence
Principal Investigator(s): View help for Principal Investigator(s) Ian Larkin; Stephen Leider
Version: View help for Version V1
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Project Citation:
Larkin, Ian, and Leider, Stephen. Replication data for: Incentive Schemes, Sorting, and Behavioral Biases of Employees: Experimental Evidence. Nashville, TN: American Economic Association [publisher], 2012. Ann Arbor, MI: Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research [distributor], 2019-12-07. https://doi.org/10.3886/E116441V1
Project Description
Summary:
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We investigate how the convexity of a firm's incentives interacts with worker overconfidence to affect sorting decisions and performance. We demonstrate, experimentally, that overconfident employees are more likely to sort into a nonlinear incentive scheme over a linear one, even though this reduces pay for many subjects and despite the presence of clear feedback. Additionally, the linear scheme attracts
demotivated, underconfident workers who perform below their ability. Our findings suggest that firms may design incentive schemes that adapt to the behavioral biases of employees to "sort in" ("sort away") attractive (unattractive) employees; such schemes may also reduce a firm's wage bill. (JEL D03, D83, J24, J31, M12)
Scope of Project
Subject Terms:
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Laboratory Experiment;
Incentives;
Overconfidence
JEL Classification:
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D91 Micro-Based Behavioral Economics: Role and Effects of Psychological, Emotional, Social, and Cognitive Factors on Decision Making
D83 Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
J24 Human Capital; Skills; Occupational Choice; Labor Productivity
J31 Wage Level and Structure; Wage Differentials
M12 Personnel Management; Executives; Executive Compensation
D91 Micro-Based Behavioral Economics: Role and Effects of Psychological, Emotional, Social, and Cognitive Factors on Decision Making
D83 Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
J24 Human Capital; Skills; Occupational Choice; Labor Productivity
J31 Wage Level and Structure; Wage Differentials
M12 Personnel Management; Executives; Executive Compensation
Geographic Coverage:
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United States
Time Period(s):
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4/2009 – 5/2009
Universe:
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Experimental Sessions were run at the Harvard Business School CLER lab using the standard subject pool.
Data Type(s):
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experimental data
Methodology
Data Source:
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Laboratory Experiments
Unit(s) of Observation:
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Individuals,
Related Publications
Published Versions
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