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Project Citation: 

Ellison, Glenn, and Ellison, Sara Fisher. Replication data for: Strategic Entry Deterrence and the Behavior of Pharmaceutical Incumbents Prior to Patent Expiration. Nashville, TN: American Economic Association [publisher], 2011. Ann Arbor, MI: Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research [distributor], 2019-12-07. https://doi.org/10.3886/E116440V1

Project Description

Summary:  View help for Summary This paper develops a new approach to testing for strategic entry deterrence and applies it to the behavior of pharmaceutical incumbents before patent expiration. It examines a cross section of markets, determining whether behavior is nonmonotonic in market size. Under some conditions, investment levels will be monotone in market size if firms do not invest to deter entry. Strategic investments to deter entry, however, may result in nonmonotonic investment because they are unnecessary in small markets, and impossible in large ones. Consistent with an entry-deterrence motivation is the finding that incumbents in medium-sized markets advertise less prior to patent expiration. (JEL D92, G31, L11, L21, L65)

Scope of Project

JEL Classification:  View help for JEL Classification
      D25 Intertemporal Firm Choice: Investment, Capacity, and Financing
      G31 Capital Budgeting; Fixed Investment and Inventory Studies; Capacity
      L11 Production, Pricing, and Market Structure; Size Distribution of Firms
      L21 Business Objectives of the Firm
      L65 Chemicals; Rubber; Drugs; Biotechnology; Plastics


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