Replication data for: Consumers as Tax Auditors
Principal Investigator(s): View help for Principal Investigator(s) Joana Naritomi
Version: View help for Version V1
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data | 10/26/2021 01:16:PM | ||
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text/plain | 14.6 KB | 12/07/2019 02:39:AM |
Project Citation:
Naritomi, Joana. Replication data for: Consumers as Tax Auditors. Nashville, TN: American Economic Association [publisher], 2019. Ann Arbor, MI: Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research [distributor], 2019-12-07. https://doi.org/10.3886/E116185V1
Project Description
Summary:
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To investigate the enforcement value of third-party information on potentially collusive taxpayers, I study an anti-tax evasion program that rewards consumers for ensuring that firms report sales and establishes a verification system to aid whistle-blowing consumers in Sao Paulo, Brazil (Nota Fiscal Paulista). Firms reported sales increased by at least 21 percent over 4 years. The results are consistent with fixed costs of concealing collusion, increased detection probability from whistle-blower threats, and with behavioral biases associated with lotteries amplifying the enforcement value of the program. Although firms increased reported expenses, tax revenue net of rewards increased by 9.3 percent.
Scope of Project
JEL Classification:
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D22 Firm Behavior: Empirical Analysis
H25 Business Taxes and Subsidies including sales and value-added (VAT)
H26 Tax Evasion and Avoidance
L25 Firm Performance: Size, Diversification, and Scope
O14 Industrialization; Manufacturing and Service Industries; Choice of Technology
O17 Formal and Informal Sectors; Shadow Economy; Institutional Arrangements
D22 Firm Behavior: Empirical Analysis
H25 Business Taxes and Subsidies including sales and value-added (VAT)
H26 Tax Evasion and Avoidance
L25 Firm Performance: Size, Diversification, and Scope
O14 Industrialization; Manufacturing and Service Industries; Choice of Technology
O17 Formal and Informal Sectors; Shadow Economy; Institutional Arrangements
Geographic Coverage:
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Brazil
Time Period(s):
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1/2004 – 12/2011 (Main analysis)
Data Type(s):
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administrative records data
Collection Notes:
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The data was de-indentified, but it is still considered confidential i
Methodology
Data Source:
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Tax authority of Sao Paulo (SEFAZ/SP), 2004 -2011
Unit(s) of Observation:
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firms,
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