Replication data for: Consumers as Tax Auditors

Principal Investigator(s):  View help for Principal Investigator(s) Joana Naritomi

Version:  View help for Version V1

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LICENSE.txt text/plain 14.6 KB 12/07/2019 02:39:AM

Project Citation: 

Naritomi, Joana. Replication data for: Consumers as Tax Auditors. Nashville, TN: American Economic Association [publisher], 2019. Ann Arbor, MI: Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research [distributor], 2019-12-07. https://doi.org/10.3886/E116185V1

Project Description

Summary:  View help for Summary To investigate the enforcement value of third-party information on potentially collusive taxpayers, I study an anti-tax evasion program that rewards consumers for ensuring that firms report sales and establishes a verification system to aid whistle-blowing consumers in Sao Paulo, Brazil (Nota Fiscal Paulista). Firms reported sales increased by at least 21 percent over 4 years. The results are consistent with fixed costs of concealing collusion, increased detection probability from whistle-blower threats, and with behavioral biases associated with lotteries amplifying the enforcement value of the program. Although firms increased reported expenses, tax revenue net of rewards increased by 9.3 percent.

Scope of Project

JEL Classification:  View help for JEL Classification
      D22 Firm Behavior: Empirical Analysis
      H25 Business Taxes and Subsidies including sales and value-added (VAT)
      H26 Tax Evasion and Avoidance
      L25 Firm Performance: Size, Diversification, and Scope
      O14 Industrialization; Manufacturing and Service Industries; Choice of Technology
      O17 Formal and Informal Sectors; Shadow Economy; Institutional Arrangements
Geographic Coverage:  View help for Geographic Coverage Brazil
Time Period(s):  View help for Time Period(s) 1/2004 – 12/2011 (Main analysis)
Data Type(s):  View help for Data Type(s) administrative records data
Collection Notes:  View help for Collection Notes The data was de-indentified, but it is still considered confidential i

Methodology

Data Source:  View help for Data Source Tax authority of Sao Paulo (SEFAZ/SP), 2004 -2011
Unit(s) of Observation:  View help for Unit(s) of Observation firms,

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Published Versions

V1 [2019-12-07]

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