Replication data for: Corruption Dynamics: The Golden Goose Effect
Principal Investigator(s): View help for Principal Investigator(s) Paul Niehaus; Sandip Sukhtankar
Version: View help for Version V1
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Project Citation:
Niehaus, Paul, and Sukhtankar, Sandip. Replication data for: Corruption Dynamics: The Golden Goose Effect. Nashville, TN: American Economic Association [publisher], 2013. Ann Arbor, MI: Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research [distributor], 2019-10-13. https://doi.org/10.3886/E114842V1
Project Description
Summary:
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Theoretical work on disciplining corrupt agents has emphasized
the role of expected future rents -- for example, efficiency wages. Yet
taken seriously this approach implies that illicit future rents should
also deter corruption. We study this "golden goose" effect in the
context of a statutory wage increase in India's employment guarantee
scheme, comparing official microrecords to original household
survey data to measure corruption. We estimate large golden goose
effects that reduced the total impact of the wage increase on theft
by roughly 64 percent. In short, rent expectations matter.
(JEL D73, D82, H83, J41, K42, O17, O21)
Scope of Project
Subject Terms:
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Household survey data
JEL Classification:
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D73 Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption
D82 Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
H83 Public Administration; Public Sector Accounting and Audits
J41 Labor Contracts
K42 Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law
O17 Formal and Informal Sectors; Shadow Economy; Institutional Arrangements
O21 Planning Models; Planning Policy
D73 Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption
D82 Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
H83 Public Administration; Public Sector Accounting and Audits
J41 Labor Contracts
K42 Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law
O17 Formal and Informal Sectors; Shadow Economy; Institutional Arrangements
O21 Planning Models; Planning Policy
Geographic Coverage:
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India, Odisha, Andhra Pradesh
Time Period(s):
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3/2007 – 3/2008
Universe:
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Beneficiaries of the National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme (NREGS or NREGA) in two states in India
Data Type(s):
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survey data;
administrative records data
Methodology
Unit(s) of Observation:
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Households,
individuals,
Related Publications
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