Replication data for: Fast-Track Authority and International Trade Negotiations

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Project Citation:

Conconi, Paola, Facchini, Giovanni, and Zanardi, Maurizio. Replication data for: Fast-Track Authority and International Trade Negotiations. Nashville, TN: American Economic Association [publisher], 2012. Ann Arbor, MI: Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research [distributor], 2019-10-13. https://doi.org/10.3886/E114789V1

Project Description

Summary: We develop a simple model of trade relations in which legislators with different stakes in import-competing and export industries decide whether to grant fast-track authority (FTA) to the president, giving up the power to amend international trade agreements. We show that strategic delegation motives are key to understanding FTA votes, which involve a decision between alternative country representatives: the executive or the majority in Congress. We then examine the determinants of all votes by US congressmen on FTA since the introduction of this institutional procedure in 1974. Our empirical analysis provides strong support for the predictions of the model. (JEL D72, F12, F13)

Scope of Project

JEL Classification:
      D72 Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
      F12 Models of Trade with Imperfect Competition and Scale Economies; Fragmentation
      F13 Trade Policy; International Trade Organizations

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V1 [2019-10-13]

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