Name File Type Size Last Modified
  boehringer_carbone_rutherford_AEJ_policy_model_files 10/13/2019 02:56:AM
LICENSE.txt text/plain 14.6 KB 10/12/2019 10:56:PM

Project Citation: 

Böhringer, Christoph, Carbone, Jared C., and Rutherford, Thomas F. Replication data for: The Strategic Value of Carbon Tariffs. Nashville, TN: American Economic Association [publisher], 2016. Ann Arbor, MI: Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research [distributor], 2019-10-13. https://doi.org/10.3886/E114588V1

Project Description

Summary:  View help for Summary We ask whether the threat of carbon tariffs might lower the cost of reductions in world carbon emissions by inducing unregulated regions to adopt emission controls. We use a numerical model to generate payoffs of a game in which a coalition regulates emissions and chooses whether to employ carbon tariffs against unregulated regions. Unregulated regions respond by abating, retaliating, or ignoring the tariffs. In the Nash equilibrium, the use of tariffs is a credible and effective threat. It induces cooperation from noncoalition regions that lowers the cost of global abatement substantially relative to the case where the coalition acts alone. (JEL D58, F13, F18, H23, Q54, Q58)

Scope of Project

JEL Classification:  View help for JEL Classification
      D58 Computable and Other Applied General Equilibrium Models
      F13 Trade Policy; International Trade Organizations
      F18 Trade and Environment
      H23 Taxation and Subsidies: Externalities; Redistributive Effects; Environmental Taxes and Subsidies
      Q54 Climate; Natural Disasters and Their Management; Global Warming
      Q58 Environmental Economics: Government Policy


Related Publications

Published Versions

Export Metadata

Report a Problem

Found a serious problem with the data, such as disclosure risk or copyrighted content? Let us know.

This material is distributed exactly as it arrived from the data depositor. ICPSR has not checked or processed this material. Users should consult the investigator(s) if further information is desired.