Replication data for: A Procurement Auction for Toxic Assets with Asymmetric Information
Principal Investigator(s): View help for Principal Investigator(s) Olivier Armantier; Charles A. Holt; Charles R. Plott
Version: View help for Version V1
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Project Citation:
Armantier, Olivier, Holt, Charles A., and Plott, Charles R. Replication data for: A Procurement Auction for Toxic Assets with Asymmetric Information. Nashville, TN: American Economic Association [publisher], 2013. Ann Arbor, MI: Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research [distributor], 2019-10-12. https://doi.org/10.3886/E114411V1
Project Description
Summary:
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The proposed 2008 TARP auction was intended to remove "toxic"
assets from portfolios of financially stressed banks. The Treasury
selected a design whereby bids to sell different securities would
be normalized by "reference prices" that reflect relative value
estimates. We conduct a series of experiments indicating that a simple
Reference Price Auction can be an effective mechanism for avoiding
serious effects of adverse selection and strategic bid manipulation,
even with inaccurate reference prices. Beyond the TARP auction,
our results are relevant to various multi-object auctions with value
heterogeneity.
Scope of Project
JEL Classification:
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D44 Auctions
D82 Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
G21 Banks; Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
D44 Auctions
D82 Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
G21 Banks; Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
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