Replication data for: Decentralized Deterrence, with an Application to Labor Tax Auditing
Principal Investigator(s): View help for Principal Investigator(s) Edoardo Di Porto; Nicola Persico; Nicolas Sahuguet
Version: View help for Version V1
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| files-for-replication-AEJ | 10/12/2019 11:26:PM | ||
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text/plain | 14.6 KB | 10/12/2019 07:26:PM |
Project Citation:
Di Porto, Edoardo, Persico, Nicola, and Sahuguet, Nicolas. Replication data for: Decentralized Deterrence, with an Application to Labor Tax Auditing. Nashville, TN: American Economic Association [publisher], 2013. Ann Arbor, MI: Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research [distributor], 2019-10-12. https://doi.org/10.3886/E114404V1
Project Description
Summary:
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This paper studies a new strategic auditing game in which atomistic
auditors maximize the success rate of audits, and provides a method
to calibrate its parameters based on audit data. Calibrating the
model to Italian auditing data, we provide an estimate of tax evasion
based on (non-random) audit data alone. Counterfactual simulation
of the model quantifies the costs and benefits of alternative auditing
policies. We compare decentralized enforcement with a counterfactual
"commitment policy," and compute the loss from the former.
(JEL H25, H26, M42)
Scope of Project
JEL Classification:
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H25 Business Taxes and Subsidies including sales and value-added (VAT)
H26 Tax Evasion and Avoidance
M42 Auditing
H25 Business Taxes and Subsidies including sales and value-added (VAT)
H26 Tax Evasion and Avoidance
M42 Auditing
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