Replication data for: Designing Matching Mechanisms under General Distributional Constraints
Principal Investigator(s): View help for Principal Investigator(s) Masahiro Goto; Fuhito Kojima; Ryoji Kurata; Akihisa Tamura; Makoto Yokoo
Version: View help for Version V1
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Program | 10/25/2021 03:56:PM | ||
LICENSE.txt | text/plain | 14.6 KB | 10/12/2019 06:53:PM |
Project Citation:
Goto, Masahiro, Kojima, Fuhito, Kurata, Ryoji, Tamura, Akihisa, and Yokoo, Makoto. Replication data for: Designing Matching Mechanisms under General Distributional Constraints. Nashville, TN: American Economic Association [publisher], 2017. Ann Arbor, MI: Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research [distributor], 2019-10-12. https://doi.org/10.3886/E114354V1
Project Description
Summary:
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To handle various applications, we study matching under constraints. The only requirement on the constraints is heredity; given a feasible matching, any matching with fewer students at each school is also feasible. Heredity subsumes existing constraints such as regional maximum quotas and diversity constraints. With constraints, there may not exist a matching that satisfies fairness and nonwastefulness (i.e., stability). We demonstrate our new mechanism, the Adaptive Deferred Acceptance mechanism (ADA), satisfies strategy-proofness for students, nonwastefulness, and a weaker fairness property. We also offer a technique to apply ADA even if heredity is violated (e.g., minimum quotas).
Scope of Project
Subject Terms:
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two-sided matching;
school-choice
JEL Classification:
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C78 Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
D47 Market Design
D63 Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
D82 Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
I20 Education and Research Institutions: General
C78 Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
D47 Market Design
D63 Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
D82 Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
I20 Education and Research Institutions: General
Universe:
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preferences of students/schools in two-sided matching
Data Type(s):
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other:;
program source code
Collection Notes:
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Randomly generated data set
Methodology
Data Source:
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Randomly generated based on statistical model
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