Replication data for: Matching Patterns When Group Size Exceeds Two
Principal Investigator(s): View help for Principal Investigator(s) Christian Ahlin
Version: View help for Version V1
Name | File Type | Size | Last Modified |
---|---|---|---|
ReplicationforAEJ | 10/12/2019 10:45:PM | ||
LICENSE.txt | text/plain | 14.6 KB | 10/12/2019 06:45:PM |
Project Citation:
Ahlin, Christian. Replication data for: Matching Patterns When Group Size Exceeds Two. Nashville, TN: American Economic Association [publisher], 2017. Ann Arbor, MI: Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research [distributor], 2019-10-12. https://doi.org/10.3886/E114340V1
Project Description
Summary:
View help for Summary
We study one-sided matching when groups with n > 2 members are being formed. Type-complementarity rules out all but the rank-ordered grouping. Type-substitutability (for example, matching to share risk) rules out much less. It requires that every two groups must be "intertwined," in that each dominates the other at some rank. Intertwined matching is necessary and, in one context, sufficient for any grouping to be a potential equilibrium. But there are many intertwined matching patterns when n > 2. Thus, substitutability can be observationally similar to complementarity; we demonstrate this by showing that dyadic regressions can register intertwined (negative assortative) matching as homogeneous matching.
Scope of Project
JEL Classification:
View help for JEL Classification
C78 Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
C78 Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
Related Publications
Published Versions
Report a Problem
Found a serious problem with the data, such as disclosure risk or copyrighted content? Let us know.
This material is distributed exactly as it arrived from the data depositor. ICPSR has not checked or processed this material. Users should consult the investigator(s) if further information is desired.