Name File Type Size Last Modified
  Replication-Materials 10/25/2021 03:27:PM
LICENSE.txt text/plain 14.6 KB 10/12/2019 06:44:PM

Project Citation: 

Roberts, James W., and Sweeting, Andrew. Replication data for: Bailouts and the Preservation of Competition: The Case of the Federal Timber Contract Payment Modification Act. Nashville, TN: American Economic Association [publisher], 2016. Ann Arbor, MI: Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research [distributor], 2019-10-12. https://doi.org/10.3886/E114339V1

Project Description

Summary:  View help for Summary We estimate the value of competition in United States Forest Service (USFS) timber auctions, in the context of the Reagan administration's bailout of firms that faced substantial losses on existing contracts. We use a model with endogenous entry by asymmetric firms, allowing survivors to respond to the exit of bailed-out firms by entering more auctions and for these marginal entrants to have lower values than firms that would choose to enter in any event, a selective entry effect. Observed asymmetries and selective entry contribute to us finding that the bailout may have increased USFS revenues in subsequent auctions quite substantially.

Scope of Project

JEL Classification:  View help for JEL Classification
      D44 Auctions
      H81 Governmental Loans; Loan Guarantees; Credits; Grants; Bailouts
      H82 Governmental Property
      L73 Forest Products
      Q23 Renewable Resources and Conservation: Forestry
Geographic Coverage:  View help for Geographic Coverage Western US
Time Period(s):  View help for Time Period(s) 1982 – 1989

Methodology

Data Source:  View help for Data Source USFS
Unit(s) of Observation:  View help for Unit(s) of Observation Individual,

Related Publications

Published Versions

Export Metadata

Report a Problem

Found a serious problem with the data, such as disclosure risk or copyrighted content? Let us know.

This material is distributed exactly as it arrived from the data depositor. ICPSR has not checked or processed this material. Users should consult the investigator(s) if further information is desired.