Replication data for: Democratic Capital: The Nexus of Political and Economic Change
Principal Investigator(s): View help for Principal Investigator(s) Torsten Persson; Guido Tabellini
Version: View help for Version V1
Name | File Type | Size | Last Modified |
---|---|---|---|
LICENSE.txt | text/plain | 14.6 KB | 10/12/2019 03:12:PM |
demcap_table1.do | text/plain | 918 bytes | 10/12/2019 03:12:PM |
demcap_table1.dta | application/octet-stream | 13.4 KB | 10/12/2019 03:12:PM |
demcap_tables2_3.do | text/plain | 10 KB | 10/12/2019 03:12:PM |
demcap_tables2_3.dta | application/octet-stream | 4.2 MB | 10/12/2019 03:12:PM |
demcap_tables4_5.do | text/plain | 5.8 KB | 10/12/2019 03:12:PM |
demcap_tables4_5.dta | application/octet-stream | 4.8 MB | 10/12/2019 03:12:PM |
readme.txt | text/plain | 881 bytes | 10/12/2019 03:12:PM |
Project Citation:
Persson, Torsten, and Tabellini, Guido. Replication data for: Democratic Capital: The Nexus of Political and Economic Change. Nashville, TN: American Economic Association [publisher], 2009. Ann Arbor, MI: Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research [distributor], 2019-10-12. https://doi.org/10.3886/E114048V1
Project Description
Summary:
View help for Summary
We study the dynamics of economic and political change, theoretically
and empirically. Democratic capital measured by a nation's
historical experience with democracy, and the incidence of democracy
in its neighborhood, appears to reduce exit rates from democracy
and raise exit rates from autocracy. Higher democratic
capital stimulates growth by increasing the stability of democracies.
Heterogeneous effects of democracy induce sorting of countries into
political regimes, which helps explain systematic differences between
democracies and autocracies. Our results suggest the possibility of
a virtuous circle, where accumulation of physical and democratic
capital reinforce each other, promoting economic development and
consolidation of democracy. (JEL D72, I31, N10, N40, O47)
Scope of Project
JEL Classification:
View help for JEL Classification
D72 Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
O47 Empirical Studies of Economic Growth; Aggregate Productivity; Cross-Country Output Convergence
I31 General Welfare; Well-Being
N10 Economic History: Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics; Industrial Structure; Growth; Fluctuations: General, International, or Comparative
N40 Economic History: Government, War, Law, International Relations, and Regulation: General, International, or Comparative
D72 Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
O47 Empirical Studies of Economic Growth; Aggregate Productivity; Cross-Country Output Convergence
I31 General Welfare; Well-Being
N10 Economic History: Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics; Industrial Structure; Growth; Fluctuations: General, International, or Comparative
N40 Economic History: Government, War, Law, International Relations, and Regulation: General, International, or Comparative
Related Publications
Published Versions
Report a Problem
Found a serious problem with the data, such as disclosure risk or copyrighted content? Let us know.
This material is distributed exactly as it arrived from the data depositor. ICPSR has not checked or processed this material. Users should consult the investigator(s) if further information is desired.