Replication data for: Do Economists Swing for the Fences after Tenure?

Principal Investigator(s):  View help for Principal Investigator(s) Jonathan Brogaard; Joseph Engelberg; Edward Van Wesep

Version:  View help for Version V1

Name File Type Size Last Modified
  For_JEP 10/12/2019 06:38:PM
LICENSE.txt text/plain 14.6 KB 10/12/2019 02:38:PM

Project Citation: 

Brogaard, Jonathan, Engelberg, Joseph, and Van Wesep, Edward. Replication data for: Do Economists Swing for the Fences after Tenure? Nashville, TN: American Economic Association [publisher], 2018. Ann Arbor, MI: Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research [distributor], 2019-10-12. https://doi.org/10.3886/E114006V1

Project Description

Summary:  View help for Summary Using a sample of all academics who pass through top 50 economics and finance departments from 1996 through 2014, we study whether the granting of tenure leads faculty to pursue riskier ideas. We use the extreme tails of ex-post citations as our measure of risk and find that both the number of publications and the portion consisting of "home runs" peak at tenure and fall steadily for a decade thereafter. Similar patterns hold for faculty at elite (top 10) institutions and for faculty who take differing time to tenure. We find the opposite pattern among poorly cited publications: their numbers rise post-tenure.

Scope of Project

JEL Classification:  View help for JEL Classification
      A11 Role of Economics; Role of Economists; Market for Economists
      A20 Economic Education and Teaching of Economics: General


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V1 [2019-10-12]

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