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Project Citation: 

Jackson, C. Kirabo, and Schneider, Henry S. Replication data for: Do Social Connections Reduce Moral Hazard? Evidence from the New York City Taxi Industry. Nashville, TN: American Economic Association [publisher], 2011. Ann Arbor, MI: Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research [distributor], 2019-10-12. https://doi.org/10.3886/E113794V1

Project Description

Summary:  View help for Summary This study investigates the role of social networks in aligning the incentives of agents in settings with incomplete contracts. Specifically, the study examines the New York City taxi industry where taxis are often leased and lessee-drivers have worse driving outcomes than owner-drivers due to moral hazard. Using within-driver variation and instrumental variable strategies to remove selection, we find that drivers leasing from members of their country-of-birth community exhibit significantly reduced effects of moral hazard, representing an improvement of almost one-half of a standard deviation of the outcome measures. Screening is ruled out as an explanation, and other mechanisms are investigated. (JEL D82, D86, L92, Z13)

Scope of Project

JEL Classification:  View help for JEL Classification
      D82 Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
      D86 Economics of Contract: Theory
      L92 Railroads and Other Surface Transportation
      Z13 Economic Sociology; Economic Anthropology; Language; Social and Economic Stratification


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