Replication data for: In a Small Moment: Class Size and Moral Hazard in the Italian Mezzogiorno
Principal Investigator(s): View help for Principal Investigator(s) Joshua D. Angrist; Erich Battistin; Daniela Vuri
Version: View help for Version V1
Name | File Type | Size | Last Modified |
---|---|---|---|
LICENSE.txt | text/plain | 14.6 KB | 10/12/2019 09:27:AM |
Readme.pdf | application/pdf | 84.9 KB | 10/12/2019 09:27:AM |
balancing.do | text/plain | 2.3 KB | 10/12/2019 09:27:AM |
dofile_publication.do | text/plain | 26.1 KB | 10/12/2019 09:27:AM |
graphs_RD_classsize.do | text/plain | 9.2 KB | 10/12/2019 09:27:AM |
graphs_RD_score_and_cheat.do | text/plain | 10.5 KB | 10/12/2019 09:27:AM |
rd_optimal_bwidth.ado | text/plain | 5.2 KB | 10/12/2019 09:27:AM |
score_gradient.do | text/plain | 12.6 KB | 10/12/2019 09:27:AM |
smallmo.dta | application/octet-stream | 17.9 MB | 10/12/2019 09:27:AM |
smallmo_item.dta.zip | application/zip | 127.3 MB | 10/12/2019 09:27:AM |
- Total of 11 records. Records per page
- « previous Page of 2
- next »
Project Citation:
Angrist, Joshua D., Battistin, Erich, and Vuri, Daniela. Replication data for: In a Small Moment: Class Size and Moral Hazard in the Italian Mezzogiorno. Nashville, TN: American Economic Association [publisher], 2017. Ann Arbor, MI: Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research [distributor], 2019-10-12. https://doi.org/10.3886/E113698V1
Project Description
Summary:
View help for Summary
Instrumental variables (IV) estimates show strong class-size effects in Southern Italy. But Italy's Mezzogiorno is distinguished by manipulation of standardized test scores as well as by economic disadvantage. IV estimates suggest small classes increase manipulation. We argue that score manipulation is a consequence of teacher shirking. IV estimates of a causal model for achievement as a function of class size and score manipulation show that class-size effects on measured achievement are driven entirely by the relationship between class size and manipulation. These results illustrate how consequential score manipulation can arise even in assessment systems with few accountability concerns.
Scope of Project
JEL Classification:
View help for JEL Classification
D82 Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
H75 State and Local Government: Health; Education; Welfare; Public Pensions
I21 Analysis of Education
I26 Returns to Education
I28 Education: Government Policy
J24 Human Capital; Skills; Occupational Choice; Labor Productivity
R23 Urban, Rural, Regional, Real Estate, and Transportation Economics: Regional Migration; Regional Labor Markets; Population; Neighborhood Characteristics
D82 Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
H75 State and Local Government: Health; Education; Welfare; Public Pensions
I21 Analysis of Education
I26 Returns to Education
I28 Education: Government Policy
J24 Human Capital; Skills; Occupational Choice; Labor Productivity
R23 Urban, Rural, Regional, Real Estate, and Transportation Economics: Regional Migration; Regional Labor Markets; Population; Neighborhood Characteristics
Related Publications
Published Versions
Report a Problem
Found a serious problem with the data, such as disclosure risk or copyrighted content? Let us know.
This material is distributed exactly as it arrived from the data depositor. ICPSR has not checked or processed this material. Users should consult the investigator(s) if further information is desired.