Replication data for: Politics and Local Economic Growth: Evidence from India
Principal Investigator(s): View help for Principal Investigator(s) Sam Asher; Paul Novosad
Version: View help for Version V1
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Project Citation:
Asher, Sam, and Novosad, Paul. Replication data for: Politics and Local Economic Growth: Evidence from India. Nashville, TN: American Economic Association [publisher], 2017. Ann Arbor, MI: Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research [distributor], 2019-10-12. https://doi.org/10.3886/E113667V1
Project Description
Summary:
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Political favoritism affects the allocation of government resources, but is it consequential for growth? Using a close election regression discontinuity design and data from India, we measure the local economic impact of being represented by a politician in the ruling party. Favoritism leads to higher private sector employment, higher share prices of firms, and increased output as measured by night lights; the three effects are similar and economically substantive. Finally, we present evidence that politicians influence firms primarily through control over the implementation of regulation.
Scope of Project
Subject Terms:
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politics;
economics;
MLA;
constituency;
bias;
growth;
firms
JEL Classification:
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D72 Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
L51 Economics of Regulation
O17 Formal and Informal Sectors; Shadow Economy; Institutional Arrangements
O18 Economic Development: Urban, Rural, Regional, and Transportation Analysis; Housing; Infrastructure
O43 Institutions and Growth
R11 Regional Economic Activity: Growth, Development, Environmental Issues, and Changes
D72 Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
L51 Economics of Regulation
O17 Formal and Informal Sectors; Shadow Economy; Institutional Arrangements
O18 Economic Development: Urban, Rural, Regional, and Transportation Analysis; Housing; Infrastructure
O43 Institutions and Growth
R11 Regional Economic Activity: Growth, Development, Environmental Issues, and Changes
Geographic Coverage:
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india
Time Period(s):
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1/1/1990 – 1/1/2005
Universe:
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Aggregate constituency level data on all firms.
Data Type(s):
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census/enumeration data;
observational data;
aggregate data
Collection Notes:
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For up to date and better documented versions of these data, users are encouraged to look at the SHRUG at www.devdatalab.org/shrug
Methodology
Data Source:
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Indian Economic Census, Election Commission of India
Unit(s) of Observation:
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legislative constituency,
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