Replication data for: Regulation of Insurance with Adverse Selection and Switching Costs: Evidence from Medicare Part D

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Project Citation:

Polyakova, Maria. Replication data for: Regulation of Insurance with Adverse Selection and Switching Costs: Evidence from Medicare Part D. Nashville, TN: American Economic Association [publisher], 2016. Ann Arbor, MI: Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research [distributor], 2019-10-12. https://doi.org/10.3886/E113628V1

Project Description

Summary: I take advantage of regulatory and pricing dynamics in Medicare Part D to explore interactions among adverse selection, inertia, and regulation. I first document novel evidence of adverse selection and switching frictions within Part D using detailed administrative data. I then estimate a contract choice and pricing model that quantifies the importance of inertia for risk sorting. I find that in Part D switching costs help sustain an adversely-selected equilibrium. I also estimate that active ?decision making in the existing policy environment could lead to a substantial gain in annual consumer surplus of on average $400-$600 per capita--20 percent to 30 percent of average annual spending.

Scope of Project

JEL Classification:
      D82 Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
      G22 Insurance; Insurance Companies; Actuarial Studies
      H51 National Government Expenditures and Health
      I13 Health Insurance, Public and Private
      I18 Health: Government Policy; Regulation; Public Health

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Published Versions

V1 [2019-10-12]

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