Replication data for: Regulation of Insurance with Adverse Selection and Switching Costs: Evidence from Medicare Part D
Principal Investigator(s): View help for Principal Investigator(s) Maria Polyakova
Version: View help for Version V1
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| DataPrograms_App2015-0004 | 10/12/2019 12:54:PM | ||
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										text/plain | 14.6 KB | 10/12/2019 08:54:AM | 
Project Citation:
Polyakova, Maria. Replication data for: Regulation of Insurance with Adverse Selection and Switching Costs: Evidence from Medicare Part D. Nashville, TN: American Economic Association [publisher], 2016. Ann Arbor, MI: Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research [distributor], 2019-10-12. https://doi.org/10.3886/E113628V1
Project Description
													Summary: 
													View help for Summary
													
													
														I take advantage of regulatory and pricing dynamics in Medicare Part D to explore interactions among adverse selection, inertia, and regulation. I first document novel evidence of adverse selection and switching frictions within Part D using detailed administrative data. I then estimate a contract choice and pricing model that quantifies the importance of inertia for risk sorting. I find that in Part D switching costs help sustain an adversely-selected equilibrium. I also estimate that active ?decision making in the existing policy environment could lead to a substantial gain in annual consumer surplus of on average $400-$600 per capita--20 percent to 30 percent of average annual spending.
													
													
													
												
											
										
									
								
									
								
							
							
							
							Scope of Project
													JEL Classification: 
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D82 Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
G22 Insurance; Insurance Companies; Actuarial Studies
H51 National Government Expenditures and Health
I13 Health Insurance, Public and Private
I18 Health: Government Policy; Regulation; Public Health
											
											
										
									
								
									
								
									
								
									
								
									
								
									
								
									
								
							
							
							
							D82 Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
G22 Insurance; Insurance Companies; Actuarial Studies
H51 National Government Expenditures and Health
I13 Health Insurance, Public and Private
I18 Health: Government Policy; Regulation; Public Health
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