Replication data for: Cooperation in a Dynamic Fishing Game: A Framed Field Experiment

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Project Citation:

Noussair, Charles N., van Soest, Daan, and Stoop, Jan. Replication data for: Cooperation in a Dynamic Fishing Game: A Framed Field Experiment. Nashville, TN: American Economic Association [publisher], 2015. Ann Arbor, MI: Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research [distributor], 2019-10-12. https://doi.org/10.3886/E113364V1

Project Description

Summary: We derive a dynamic theoretical model of renewable resource extraction. In the social optimum, maximum extraction occurs in the last period only, while in the unique subgame perfect Nash equilibrium, the resource is depleted immediately. The predictions are tested in a field experiment conducted at a recreational fishing pond. The subjects, experienced recreational fishermen, face a dynamic social dilemma, in which they risk depletion of the resource by overfishing. We find strong support for the Nash equilibrium. Fishermen exert as much effort in the last period as in preceding periods, and effort is independent of the stock of fish.

Scope of Project

JEL Classification:
      C71 Cooperative Games
      C93 Field Experiments
      Q22 Renewable Resources and Conservation: Fishery; Aquaculture

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V1 [2019-10-12]

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