Replication data for: Naked Exclusion: An Experimental Study of Contracts with Externalities

Principal Investigator(s):  View help for Principal Investigator(s) Claudia M. Landeo; Kathryn E. Spier

Version:  View help for Version V1

Name File Type Size Last Modified
DATADESCRIPTION_SupplementaryMaterial_Appendix4_LandeoSpier_MS20080086.pdf application/pdf 6.6 KB 10/12/2019 06:01:AM
DATA_SupplementaryMaterial_Appendix3_LandeoSpier_MS20080086.xls application/vnd.ms-office 540.5 KB 10/12/2019 06:01:AM
INSTRUCTIONS_SupplementaryMaterial_Appendix1_LandeoSpier_MS20080086.pdf application/pdf 108.9 KB 10/12/2019 06:01:AM
LICENSE.txt text/plain 14.6 KB 10/12/2019 06:01:AM
MS-20080086_appendix.zip application/zip 24.6 KB 10/12/2019 06:01:AM
README_SupplementaryMaterial_Summary_LandeoSpier_MS20080086.pdf application/pdf 10.5 KB 10/12/2019 06:01:AM
SOFTWAREINSTALLATION_SupplementaryMaterial_Appendix2_LandeoSpier_MS20080086.pdf application/pdf 1.6 MB 10/12/2019 06:01:AM
landeo.war application/zip 242.1 KB 10/12/2019 06:01:AM

Project Citation: 

Landeo, Claudia M., and Spier, Kathryn E. Replication data for: Naked Exclusion: An Experimental Study of Contracts with Externalities. Nashville, TN: American Economic Association [publisher], 2009. Ann Arbor, MI: Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research [distributor], 2019-10-12. https://doi.org/10.3886/E113336V1

Project Description

Summary:  View help for Summary This paper reports the results of an experiment on exclusive contracts. We replicate the strategic environment described by Rasmusen, Ramseyer, and Wiley (1991) and Segal and Whinston (2000). Our findings are as follows. First, when the buyers can communicate, discrimination raises the likelihood of exclusion. Second, when the incumbent seller is unable to discriminate and must make the same offers to the buyers, communication reduces the likelihood of exclusion. Communication also induces more generous offers when the seller cannot discriminate, and divide-and-conquer offers when the seller can discriminate. Third, when communication is allowed, payoff endogeneity increases the likelihood of exclusion. (JEL C72, C91, D62, D86, K12, K21, L12, L42)

Scope of Project

JEL Classification:  View help for JEL Classification
      C72 Noncooperative Games
      C91 Design of Experiments: Laboratory, Individual
      D62 Externalities
      D86 Economics of Contract: Theory
      K12 Contract Law
      K21 Antitrust Law
      L12 Monopoly; Monopolization Strategies


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