Replication data for: Strategic Leniency and Cartel Enforcement

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Project Citation:

Miller, Nathan H. Replication data for: Strategic Leniency and Cartel Enforcement. Nashville, TN: American Economic Association [publisher], 2009. Ann Arbor, MI: Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research [distributor], 2019-10-12. https://doi.org/10.3886/E113304V1

Project Description

Summary: The cornerstone of cartel enforcement in the United States and elsewhere is a commitment to the lenient prosecution of early confessors. A burgeoning gametheoretical literature is ambiguous regarding the impacts of leniency. I develop a theoretical model of cartel behavior that provides empirical predictions and moment conditions, and apply the model to the complete set of indictments and information reports issued over a 20-year span. Statistical tests are consistent with the notion that leniency enhances deterrence and detection capabilities. The results have implications for market efficiency and enforcement efforts against cartels and other forms of organized crime. (JEL D43, L12, L13, K21)

Scope of Project

JEL Classification:
      D43 Market Structure, Pricing, and Design: Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
      K21 Antitrust Law
      L12 Monopoly; Monopolization Strategies
      L13 Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets

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V1 [2019-10-12]

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