Replication data for: Efficient Kidney Exchange: Coincidence of Wants in Markets with Compatibility-Based Preferences
Principal Investigator(s): View help for Principal Investigator(s) Alvin E. Roth; Tayfun Sönmez; M. Utku Ünver
Version: View help for Version V1
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Project Citation:
Roth, Alvin E., Sönmez, Tayfun, and Ünver, M. Utku. Replication data for: Efficient Kidney Exchange: Coincidence of Wants in Markets with Compatibility-Based Preferences. Nashville, TN: American Economic Association [publisher], 2007. Ann Arbor, MI: Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research [distributor], 2019-10-12. https://doi.org/10.3886/E113217V1
Project Description
Summary:
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Patients needing kidney transplants may have donors who cannot donate to them
because of blood or tissue incompatibility. Incompatible patient-donor pairs can
exchange donor kidneys with other pairs only when there is a "double coincidence
of wants." Developing infrastructure to perform three-way as well as two-way
exchanges will have a substantial effect on the number of transplants that can be
arranged. Larger than three-way exchanges have less impact on efficiency. In a
general model of type-compatible exchanges, the size of the largest exchanges
required to achieve efficiency equals the number of types. (JEL C78, I12)
Scope of Project
JEL Classification:
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C78 Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
I12 Health Behavior
C78 Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
I12 Health Behavior
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