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Project Citation: 

Eliason, Paul J., Grieco, Paul L. E., McDevitt, Ryan C., and Roberts, James W. Replication data for: Strategic Patient Discharge: The Case of Long-Term Care Hospitals. Nashville, TN: American Economic Association [publisher], 2018. Ann Arbor, MI: Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research [distributor], 2019-10-12. https://doi.org/10.3886/E113175V1

Project Description

Summary:  View help for Summary Medicare's prospective payment system for long-term acute-care hospitals (LTCHs) provides modest reimbursements at the beginning of a patient's stay before jumping discontinuously to a large lump-sum payment after a prespecified number of days. We show that LTCHs respond to the financial incentives of this system by disproportionately discharging patients after they cross the large-payment threshold. We find this occurs more often at for-profit facilities, facilities acquired by leading LTCH chains, and facilities colocated with other hospitals. Using a dynamic structural model, we evaluate counterfactual payment policies that would provide substantial savings for Medicare.

Scope of Project

JEL Classification:  View help for JEL Classification
      H51 National Government Expenditures and Health
      I11 Analysis of Health Care Markets
      I13 Health Insurance, Public and Private
      I18 Health: Government Policy; Regulation; Public Health


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