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Project Citation: 

Spenkuch, Jörg L., Montagnes, B. Pablo, and Magleby, Daniel B. Replication data for: Backward Induction in the Wild? Evidence from Sequential Voting in the US Senate. Nashville, TN: American Economic Association [publisher], 2018. Ann Arbor, MI: Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research [distributor], 2019-10-12. https://doi.org/10.3886/E113078V1

Project Description

Summary:  View help for Summary In the US Senate, roll calls are held in alphabetical order. We document that senators early in the order are less likely to vote with the majority of their own party than those whose last name places them at the end of the alphabet. To speak to the mechanism behind this result, we develop a simple model of sequential voting, in which forward-looking senators rely on backward induction in order to free ride on their colleagues. Estimating our model structurally, we find that this form of strategic behavior is an important part of equilibrium play. We also consider, but ultimately dismiss, alternative explanations related to learning about common values and vote buying.

Scope of Project

JEL Classification:  View help for JEL Classification
      D72 Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
      D82 Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
      D83 Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness


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