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Project Citation: 

Crawford, Gregory S., Pavanini, Nicola, and Schivardi, Fabiano. Replication data for: Asymmetric Information and Imperfect Competition in Lending Markets. Nashville, TN: American Economic Association [publisher], 2018. Ann Arbor, MI: Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research [distributor], 2019-10-12. https://doi.org/10.3886/E113054V1

Project Description

Summary:  View help for Summary We study the effects of asymmetric information and imperfect competition in the market for small business lines of credit. We estimate a structural model of credit demand, loan use, pricing, and firm default using matched firm-bank data from Italy. We find evidence of adverse selection in the form of a positive correlation between the unobserved determinants of demand for credit and default. Our counterfactual experiments show that while increases in adverse selection increase prices and defaults on average, reducing credit supply, banks' market power can mitigate these negative effects.

Scope of Project

JEL Classification:  View help for JEL Classification
      D22 Firm Behavior: Empirical Analysis
      D82 Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
      G21 Banks; Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
      G32 Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure; Value of Firms; Goodwill
      L13 Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
      L25 Firm Performance: Size, Diversification, and Scope


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