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Replication data for: Corruption, Trade Costs, and Gains from Tariff Liberalization: Evidence from Southern Africa
Principal Investigator(s): View help for Principal Investigator(s) Sandra Sequeira
Version: View help for Version V1
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Project Citation:
Sequeira, Sandra. Replication data for: Corruption, Trade Costs, and Gains from Tariff Liberalization: Evidence from Southern Africa. Nashville, TN: American Economic Association [publisher], 2016. Ann Arbor, MI: Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research [distributor], 2019-10-12. https://doi.org/10.3886/E113044V1
Project Description
Summary:
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This paper exploits quasi-experimental variation in tariffs in southern Africa to estimate trade elasticities. Traded quantities respond only weakly to a 30 percent reduction in the average nominal tariff rate. Trade flow data combined with primary data on firm behavior and bribe payments suggest that corruption is a potential explanation for the observed low elasticities. In contexts of pervasive corruption, even small bribes can significantly reduce tariffs, making tariff liberalization schemes less likely to affect the extensive and the intensive margins of firms' import behavior. The tariff liberalization scheme is, however, still associated with improved incentives to accurately report quantities of imported goods, and with a significant reduction in bribe transfers from importers to public officials.
Scope of Project
JEL Classification:
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D22 Firm Behavior: Empirical Analysis
D73 Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption
F13 Trade Policy; International Trade Organizations
H83 Public Administration; Public Sector Accounting and Audits
O17 Formal and Informal Sectors; Shadow Economy; Institutional Arrangements
O19 International Linkages to Development; Role of International Organizations
O24 Development Planning and Policy: Trade Policy; Factor Movement; Foreign Exchange Policy
D22 Firm Behavior: Empirical Analysis
D73 Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption
F13 Trade Policy; International Trade Organizations
H83 Public Administration; Public Sector Accounting and Audits
O17 Formal and Informal Sectors; Shadow Economy; Institutional Arrangements
O19 International Linkages to Development; Role of International Organizations
O24 Development Planning and Policy: Trade Policy; Factor Movement; Foreign Exchange Policy
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