Replication data for: Moderating Political Extremism: Single Round versus Runoff Elections under Plurality Rule

Principal Investigator(s): View help for Principal Investigator(s) Massimo Bordignon; Tommaso Nannicini; Guido Tabellini

Version: View help for Version V1

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Project Citation:

Bordignon, Massimo, Nannicini, Tommaso, and Tabellini, Guido. Replication data for: Moderating Political Extremism: Single Round versus Runoff Elections under Plurality Rule. Nashville, TN: American Economic Association [publisher], 2016. Ann Arbor, MI: Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research [distributor], 2019-10-12. https://doi.org/10.3886/E112940V1

Project Description

Summary: We compare single round versus runoff elections under plurality rule, allowing for partly endogenous party formation. Under runoff elections, the number of political candidates is larger, but the influence of extremist voters on equilibrium policy, and hence policy volatility, is smaller because the bargaining power of the political extremes is reduced compared to single round elections. The predictions on the number of candidates and on policy volatility are confirmed by evidence from a regression discontinuity design in Italy, where cities above 15,000 inhabitants elect the mayor with a runoff system, while those below hold single round elections.

Scope of Project

Subject Terms: electoral rules; political extremism

JEL Classification:
C78 Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
D72 Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior

Geographic Coverage: Italy

Universe: population, number of candidates for mayor ,and policy outcomes (tax rates) of all Italian municipalities

Data Type(s): administrative records data; census/enumeration data; other:

Methodology

Data Source: Italian Minister of the INterior and Italian statistical agency

Unit(s) of Observation: municipalities,

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Published Versions

V1 [2019-10-12]

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