Replication data for: Monitoring Corruptible Politicians
Principal Investigator(s): View help for Principal Investigator(s) Gustavo J. Bobonis; Luis R. Cámara Fuertes; Rainer Schwabe
Version: View help for Version V1
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Project Citation:
Bobonis, Gustavo J., Cámara Fuertes, Luis R., and Schwabe, Rainer. Replication data for: Monitoring Corruptible Politicians. Nashville, TN: American Economic Association [publisher], 2016. Ann Arbor, MI: Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research [distributor], 2019-10-12. https://doi.org/10.3886/E112932V1
Project Description
Summary:
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Does monitoring corrupt activities induce a sustained reduction in corruption? Using longitudinal data on audits of municipal governments in Puerto Rico, we show corruption is considerably lower in municipalities with timely audits—before elections. However, these municipalities do not exhibit decreased levels of corruption in subsequent audits, even while mayors in these benefit from higher reelection rates. Our results suggest that audits enable voters to select responsive but corruptible politicians to office. Audit programs must disseminate results when they are most relevant for voters—shortly before an election—and ensure that these programs are sustained, long-term commitments.
Scope of Project
Subject Terms:
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observational data
JEL Classification:
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D72 Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
H83 Public Administration; Public Sector Accounting and Audits
K42 Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law
O17 Formal and Informal Sectors; Shadow Economy; Institutional Arrangements
D72 Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
H83 Public Administration; Public Sector Accounting and Audits
K42 Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law
O17 Formal and Informal Sectors; Shadow Economy; Institutional Arrangements
Geographic Coverage:
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Puerto Rico (USA)
Time Period(s):
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1/1987 – 12/2005
Universe:
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Municipal governments audited by Office of Comptroller of Puerto Rico during period 1987-2005
Data Type(s):
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administrative records data;
census/enumeration data;
observational data
Methodology
Unit(s) of Observation:
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municipality and audit period,
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