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Project Citation: 

Hackmann, Martin B., Kolstad, Jonathan T., and Kowalski, Amanda E. Replication data for: Adverse Selection and an Individual Mandate: When Theory Meets Practice. Nashville, TN: American Economic Association [publisher], 2015. Ann Arbor, MI: Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research [distributor], 2019-10-12. https://doi.org/10.3886/E112926V1

Project Description

Summary:  View help for Summary We develop a model of selection that incorporates a key element of recent health reforms: an individual mandate. Using data from Massachusetts, we estimate the parameters of the model. In the individual market for health insurance, we find that premiums and average costs decreased significantly in response to the individual mandate. We find an annual welfare gain of 4.1 percent per person or $51.1 million annually in Massachusetts as a result of the reduction in adverse selection. We also find smaller post-reform markups. (JEL D82, G22, H75, I13)

Scope of Project

JEL Classification:  View help for JEL Classification
      D82 Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
      G22 Insurance; Insurance Companies; Actuarial Studies
      H75 State and Local Government: Health; Education; Welfare; Public Pensions
      I13 Health Insurance, Public and Private


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