Replication data for: Information Disclosure as a Matching Mechanism: Theory and Evidence from a Field Experiment
Principal Investigator(s): View help for Principal Investigator(s) Steven Tadelis; Florian Zettelmeyer
Version: View help for Version V1
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Project Citation:
Tadelis, Steven, and Zettelmeyer, Florian. Replication data for: Information Disclosure as a Matching Mechanism: Theory and Evidence from a Field Experiment. Nashville, TN: American Economic Association [publisher], 2015. Ann Arbor, MI: Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research [distributor], 2019-10-11. https://doi.org/10.3886/E112866V1
Project Description
Summary:
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Market outcomes depend on the quality of information available to
its participants. We measure the effect of information disclosure on
market outcomes using a large-scale field experiment that randomly
discloses quality information in wholesale automobile auctions. We
argue that buyers in this market are horizontally differentiated across
cars that are vertically ranked by quality. This implies that information
disclosure helps match heterogeneous buyers to cars of varying quality, causing both good and bad news to increase competition and revenues. The data confirm these hypotheses. These findings have implications for the design of other markets, including e-commerce, procurement auctions, and labor markets. (JEL C93, D44, D82, L15)
Scope of Project
JEL Classification:
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C93 Field Experiments
D44 Auctions
D82 Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
L15 Information and Product Quality; Standardization and Compatibility
C93 Field Experiments
D44 Auctions
D82 Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
L15 Information and Product Quality; Standardization and Compatibility
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