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Project Citation: 

Isoni, Andrea, Poulsen, Anders, Sugden, Robert, and Tsutsui, Kei. Replication data for: Efficiency, Equality, and Labeling: An Experimental Investigation of Focal Points in Explicit Bargaining. Nashville, TN: American Economic Association [publisher], 2014. Ann Arbor, MI: Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research [distributor], 2019-10-11. https://doi.org/10.3886/E112698V1

Project Description

Summary:  View help for Summary We investigate Schelling's hypothesis that payoff-irrelevant labels ("cues") can influence the outcomes of bargaining games with communication. In our experimental games, players negotiate over the division of a surplus by claiming valuable objects that have payoff-irrelevant spatial locations. Negotiation occurs in continuous time, constrained by a deadline. In some games, spatial cues are opposed to principles of equality or efficiency. We find a strong tendency for players to agree on efficient and minimally unequal payoff divisions, even if spatial cues suggest otherwise. But if there are two such divisions, cues are often used to select between them, inducing distributional effects.

Scope of Project

Subject Terms:  View help for Subject Terms Laboratory experiment
JEL Classification:  View help for JEL Classification
      C78 Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
      D63 Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
      D83 Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
Geographic Coverage:  View help for Geographic Coverage United Kingdom
Time Period(s):  View help for Time Period(s) 6/1/2010 – 11/30/2012
Universe:  View help for Universe University of East Anglia general student population
Data Type(s):  View help for Data Type(s) experimental data

Methodology

Unit(s) of Observation:  View help for Unit(s) of Observation Individuals,

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