Replication data for: Political Aid Cycles

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Project Citation:

Faye, Michael, and Niehaus, Paul. Replication data for: Political Aid Cycles. Nashville, TN: American Economic Association [publisher], 2012. Ann Arbor, MI: Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research [distributor], 2019-10-11. https://doi.org/10.3886/E112574V1

Project Description

Summary: Researchers have scrutinized foreign aid's effects on poverty and growth, but anecdotal evidence suggests that donors often use aid for other ends. We test whether donors use bilateral aid to influence elections in developing countries. We find that recipient country administrations closely aligned with a donor receive more aid during election years, while those less aligned receive less. Consistent with our interpretation, this effect holds only in competitive elections, is absent in US aid flows to non-government entities, and is driven by bilateral alignment rather than incumbent characteristics.

Scope of Project

JEL Classification:
      D72 Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
      F35 Foreign Aid
      O17 Formal and Informal Sectors; Shadow Economy; Institutional Arrangements
      O19 International Linkages to Development; Role of International Organizations

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V1 [2019-10-11]

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