Replication data for: Screening, Competition, and Job Design: Economic Origins of Good Jobs
Principal Investigator(s): View help for Principal Investigator(s) Björn Bartling; Ernst Fehr; Klaus M. Schmidt
Version: View help for Version V1
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Project Citation:
Bartling, Björn, Fehr, Ernst, and Schmidt, Klaus M. Replication data for: Screening, Competition, and Job Design: Economic Origins of Good Jobs. Nashville, TN: American Economic Association [publisher], 2012. Ann Arbor, MI: Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research [distributor], 2019-10-11. https://doi.org/10.3886/E112514V1
Project Description
Summary:
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High-performance work systems give workers more discretion, thereby increasing effort productivity but also shirking opportunities. We show experimentally that screening for work attitude and labor market competition are causal determinants of the viability of high-performance work systems, and we identify the complementarities between discretion, rent-sharing, and screening that render them profitable. Two fundamentally distinct job designs emerge endogenously in our experiments: "bad" jobs with low discretion, low wages, and little rent-sharing, and "good" jobs with high discretion, high wages, and substantial rent-sharing. Good jobs are profitable only if employees can be screened, and labor market competition fosters their dissemination. (JEL D12, D82, J24, J31, J41, M12, M54)
Scope of Project
Subject Terms:
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laboratory experment
JEL Classification:
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D12 Consumer Economics: Empirical Analysis
D82 Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
J24 Human Capital; Skills; Occupational Choice; Labor Productivity
J31 Wage Level and Structure; Wage Differentials
J41 Labor Contracts
M12 Personnel Management; Executives; Executive Compensation
M54 Personnel Economics: Labor Management
D12 Consumer Economics: Empirical Analysis
D82 Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
J24 Human Capital; Skills; Occupational Choice; Labor Productivity
J31 Wage Level and Structure; Wage Differentials
J41 Labor Contracts
M12 Personnel Management; Executives; Executive Compensation
M54 Personnel Economics: Labor Management
Geographic Coverage:
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Switzerland
Universe:
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student subjects
Data Type(s):
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experimental data
Methodology
Data Source:
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laboratory experiment
Unit(s) of Observation:
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experimental subjects,
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