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Project Citation: 

Cebul, Randall D., Rebitzer, James B., Taylor, Lowell J., and Votruba, Mark E. Replication data for: Unhealthy Insurance Markets: Search Frictions and the Cost and Quality of Health Insurance. Nashville, TN: American Economic Association [publisher], 2011. Ann Arbor, MI: Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research [distributor], 2019-10-11. https://doi.org/10.3886/E112448V1

Project Description

Summary:  View help for Summary We analyze the effect of search frictions in the market for commercial health insurance. Frictions increase insurance premiums (enough to transfer 13.2 percent of consumer surplus from fully insured employer groups to insurers—approximately $34.4 billion in 1997); and increase insurance turnover (by 64 percent for the average policy). This rent transfer harms consumers and—when combined with heightened turnover—reduces incentives to invest in future health. We also find that a publicly financed insurance option can improve the efficiency of private insurance markets by reducing search friction induced distortions in pricing and marketing efforts. (JEL D83 G22, I18)

Scope of Project

JEL Classification:  View help for JEL Classification
      D83 Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
      G22 Insurance; Insurance Companies; Actuarial Studies
      I18 Health: Government Policy; Regulation; Public Health


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